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Hans Sin ger*
Food Aid: Disaster Cure and/or Prevention?
Nobody feels happy with the way the Ethiopian and
other SSA emergencies have been handled. The
doubts extend all the way from whether the emergency
could have been prevented or mitigated by timely
preventive action, using the potential of food aid as a
developmental tool rather than an emergency tool. In
recent years emergency food aid has not absorbed
more than 20 per cent of total food aid (in terms of
cereals two million tons out of 10 million tons).
Although it must be anticipated that in the immediate
future this percentage will be much higher - perhaps
as much as 40 or 50 per cent - much food aid will
remain to be directed to broader developmental
purposes: balance-of-payments support, structural
adjustment support, food for work and other
development projects, support for human capital such
as child feeding, school meals, etc. The question
inevitably is whether some of this 80 per Cent of past
food aid could have been more successfully directed
towards prevention of the kind of disaster we are now
witnessing.
Next in line is the question of earlier warning of
impending famine. More or less predictably, almost
every agency and other institution involved in food
aid, as well as recipient governments, now claims that
they gave advance warning of impending famine but
were not listened to. One can be slightly sceptical of
some of these claims now - if everybody knew in
advance and warned each other in advance, why then
was there so little action in advance? There are answers
to this question: perhaps everybody knew but waited
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for the other to take action; or perhaps the knowledge
was there but the political will to act was not: or
perhaps the knowledge was there but the administrative
capacity or the budgetary or legal resources needed for
quick action were not, etc., etc., Be that as it may, here
is certainly an agenda for the future. How can we get
timelier and better co-ordinated action on such
warnings? On what indicators or data should early
warning be based? Who should be charged with the
responsibility of issuing early warning and how should
such early warnings be disseminated? There are many
questions here to which there are no easy answers, but
there is now general agreement that something must
be done to improve things. At the IDS seminar many
ideas and suggestions were put forward which cannot
be discussed in detail here.
The voluntary agencies or NGOs, in particular, are
among the claimants that they are in a better position
than governmental agencies to have early warning of
impending disasters; that in fact they issued such early
warnings but were not listened to by the governments.
This claim would be worth some impartial investigation
now since it might help to provide guidance for
prompter action in the future. Some NGO representa-
tives would put it: 'We have the knowledge but do not
have the resources to take action on the scale required;
you (the governments) have the resources but lack the
knowledge'. There is some truth in this, and certainly
one problem is to marry the knowledge (wherever it
may be) with the resources (wherever they may be).
The question of earlier warning also raises the
question of the indicators or type of information
needed. This came up frequently in the seminar. There
is a broad consensus on the type of data that are useful:
they obviously include rainfall data, crop monitoring,
data on seeding and planting, data on population
movement and specifically rural/urban migration,
local stock movement, rising local food prices and
falling prices of livestock and other assets which
people anticipating famine try to sell, nutritional
status of children and other vulnerable groups, etc.
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Advance agreement on the relative weight to be given
to these different indicators and the relative effort to
be devoted to their collection and dissemination is
perhaps less important than the collation of all
possible data for any given situation and relevant local
areas. Normally a really systematic effort will require
the collaboration of the local government, and this
immediately raises the kind of political problem
discussed in the next paragraph. Data for Africa of the
normal macro or micro economic type are notoriously
scarce and unreliable; it is all the more important that
a concentrated effort should be made to produce
reliable data more specifically directed to the early
signs of impending famine.
The Politics of Early Warning
We have just referred to the political problems
involved. The local government, for various reasons,
may not wish early signs of a famine to be made known
or disseminated. In such cases, is it neo-colonialist to
go over the head of the national government? A
negative answer to this question seems very tempting,
but it must be remembered that subsequent action to
supply food in time to starving people may depend on
the collaboration of the local government which in
turn may be put in question by disagreements on early
warning signs. The situation can also be reversed: the
local government may claim that a famine is coming in
order to obtain additional food aid when in fact it
ought to be able to deal with the situation by normal
local distribution and normal policies. The important
political dimension of food aid for SSA emergencies is
illustrated by the fact that in all four worst cases, i.e.
Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad and Mozambique, there are
internal civil wars, rebellions and/or foreign incursions.
The support of the local government may be necessary
but in such situations is clearly not sufficient: how can
one get food aid into areas not controlled by the local
government and in which the local government may
perhaps deliberately wish to starve out its opponents?
Here clearly the NGOs are at a certain advantage,
although the present situation does not suggest that
they have much elbow room to utilise it. Furthermore,
among the governmental aid programmes bilateral
programmes have probably more opportunity as well
as incentive to include rebellious areas in food aid,
whereas the multilateral programmes by their
constitutions are committed to deal with the legal
government only.
The early information needed is of course not limited
to impending famine requirements but must also
extend to the supply side of food aid. What are the
stocks available which can be drawn upon at short
notice? Where are they located? Who controls them? Is
there quick access to them? What is the logistic
infrastructure for distribution as needed - and the
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term 'infrastructure' goes well beyond the obvious
physical infrastructure of transport, roads, storage
space, etc.. extending also to institutional arrange-
ments which again are partly governmental arrange-
ments, raising once again the political problems
already mentioned.
Early action has aspecial premium attached to it. If
the support can reach the people threatened by famine
before they have sold their cattle, eaten their seeds,
used up their food stocks and started tracking from
their villages to the roads or camps or other areas in
search of food, obviously rehabilitation will be
possible and easier. Once the area is deserted it will be
difficult to think in terms of getting back to 'normal' in
the future. This does not rule out the possibility that in
certain cases it may be the right policy to vacate settled
areas and resettle the people in a more promising
environment. In such cases a Machiavellian case could
be made for delaying aid until people are on the move.
But obviously we are on dangerous ground here: in
most actual cases involved such Machiavellian policies
would be motivitated by politics more than by 'clever'
economics. In. any case, if resettlement seems
indicated, there must be better ways than starving
those to be resettled out of their present villages, and a
famine is not a promising context for successful
resettlement.
Macroeconomics and Food Supply
The general feeling at the seminar was that a good deal
of information was in fact available which was not
properly brought together and utilised. In particular,
some ofthe more macroeconomic information such as
that collected by IMF missions and to some extent also
by the World Bank in connection with structural
adjustment lending is very relevant. For example, the
debt situation and prospects of debt rescheduling
clearly have a major impact on the capacity of an
African country threatened by famine to import food
commercially. In turn, information on the food
situation and matters relating to food aid should be
more fully taken into account in the consortia and
consultative group meetings usually chaired by the
World Bank, and should also be available to IMF
missions in making their recommendations. At
present, matters relating to food aid are either entirely
absent from the consortia discussions or grossly
neglected - this is one aspect of the price we pay for
the institutional separation of financial aid and food
aid in the UN system, with the former handled by the
World Bank and the latter handled by the
UN/FAO/WFP. This does not make for the best use
of total available resources in the fight against famine.
There is also plenty of scope for improved and better
co-ordination in the assessment missions by food aid
Mother and child await food rations in Eritrea.
donors. Separate missions of this kind by individual
donors place a great strain on the limited administrative
capacity in the African famine countries, and divert
harassed officials from their main object of trying to
cope with the situation. Also, such separate
assessment does not provide a favourable setting for
proper co-ordination of donor action. Here again
politics may intervene: some recipient countries may
in fact prefer to deal with individual donors separately
rather than face a solid phalanx of donors. Really
effective co-ordination can only be achieved with the
full cooperation of the recipient government, so better
co-ordination among donors alone may take us a
certain way but not all the way.
Since the voluntary organisations (NGOs) often have
more detailed local knowledge it would be desirable to
include them in information and assessment systems.
On the other hand there is a risk of diverting them
from their real operational objectives into providing
information, attending meetings, etc. The central UN
organisation for providing warning and information
in disaster situations is the United Nations Disaster
Relief Organization (UNDRO) in Geneva. But while
UNDRO has the means of rapid and wide
dissemination of information it has practically no field
staff of its own to collect and check information, and
deals with sudden disasters rather than droughts and
with non-food needs rather than food. In this respect
the other two major information systems, the FAO
early warning system and the US Department of
Agriculture data system are better equipped but do
not always agree with each other. So wherever we turn
there are problems and difficulties.
Action First: Then Detailed Assessment?
One approach that found much favour in the seminar
was the 'two-phase approach'. This means that in an
impending disaster situation one does not start with
time-consuming and difficult assessments leading to
lengthy international discussions but with rapid
action, preferably co-ordinated and certainly carefully
arranged in advance on a stand-by basis. On a small
scale, the Swiss rapid deployment system for quick
stand-by action, including advance agreements with
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Ngovernments likely to be famine or disaster-prone was
discussed, and recommended itself to many of the
participants. This quick action would then provide a
breathing space during which the best possible
assessment of total needs, logistic problems, etc.
should be made, laying the foundation for longer-term
co-ordinated action. Quick initial action of course can
be greatly facilitated by advance positioning of food
earmarked for aid in emergencies. The largest food aid
programme, the US PL480 programme, has in fact
decided on such a policy of prepositioning stocks
nearer potential famine areas (in this case in Niger and
Kenya), but apparently this policy has run into some
difficulties. There are obvious questions of political
selection of depository countries, control of stocks,
etc. The WFP has tried to solve such problems by
doing its prepositioning outside the famine area itself,
in Rotterdam and Singapore, ready for speedy
despatch when and where needed.
Discussions in the seminar brought forward a number
of issues in respect to which emergency food aid has
'Food for Work' schemes avert crises.
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proved to be inadequately conducted in the light of the
present crisis in Africa. As an example the issue of
emergency rations may be cited. It was found that the
guidelines presently existing for the provision of
emergency rations are unclear, resulting in different
and often unsatisfactory levels of rations being
provided. One of the suggestions emerging from the
seminar was the convening as a matter of urgency of
an expert group to draw up uniform guidelines for
emergency rations. The proposed new guidelines
should be pre-tested in ongoing emergency operations
before they are brought to the attention of recipient
countries and donor food aid organisations. Ultimately
there could be an international agreement on
emergency rations which could prevent future
discrepancies. It is to be hoped that these and other
matters arising from the seminar for further follow-up
can be actively pursued in the future. The impartial
evaluation of lessons to be learned from emergency
food aid experiences in the different sub-Saharan
African situations is another matter on which some
understanding and agreement is urgently needed.
)
Resource and Allocation Constraints
One great problem which recurs in all the discussions
on emergency food aid in sub-Saharan Africa is that
the emergency food aid requirements in that region are
so enormous that they strain the resources available
for total global food aid. This carried the risk on the
one hand that legitimate emergency food aid needs
will not be satisfied because of equally legitimate
ongoing developmental or balance-of-payments pro-
grammes among more regular recipients of food aid in
other regions, such as Egypt or Bangladesh. On the
other hand, there is a risk that if such other perfectly
legitimate developmental and balance-of-payments
purposes of food aid are disrupted in order to cover
the emergency needs of sub-Saharan Africa, this may
well lay the foundation for future emergencies in the
affected countries - some of them much larger than
most or all of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.
The old division, whether conceptual, administrative
or resource allocative, between emergency food aid
and non-emergency or developmental food aid simply
collapses in the light of the present African experience,
and a new approach is needed. Proper emergency food
aid which would include the timely prevention of
emergencies as well as the reconstruction or
rehabilitation period after the immediate emergency
until a more normal situation is reached, would
include many elements of what used to be defined as
developmental or non-emergency food aid, as well as
the emergency part. It is likely that a future division
should not be so much in terms of emergency versus
non-emergency food aid, but rather in terms of
'special' food aid needed in the SSA region versus
more 'normal' food aid needed elsewhere. The
10 million ton volume and the corresponding UN
target may be adequate for the latter category but
should not be expected to cover the former category as
well. In the case of the former category, i.e. the special
needs of the SSA region, food aid should be
administered and applied much more in co-ordination
with financial aid and with technical assistance than
has been the case in the past. The creation of the World
Bank/IDA Special Fund for sub-Saharan Africa may
provide an opportunity to remedy some of the
consequences of the historical separation, within the
UN system, of financial aid administered by the World
Bank and food aid administered by the UN/FAO/
WFP. In that sense the crisis may perhaps present a
new opportunïty, as well as a desperate challenge.
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